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Abstract—In Online Social Networks (OSNs), interpersonal
communication and information sharing are happening all the
time, and it is real-time. When a user initiates an activity in
OSNs, immediately, he/she will have a certain influence in his/her
friendship circle naturally, some users in the initiator’s friendship
circle will be attracted to participate in this activity. Based on
such a fact, we design a k-hop Collaborate Game Model, which
means that an activity initiated by a user can only influence those
users whose distance are within k-hop from this initiator in OSNs.
Besides, we introduce the problem of Revenue Maximization
under k-hop Collaborate Game (RMKCG), which identifies a
limited number of initiators in order to obtain revenue as much
as possible. Collaborate Game Model describes in detail how to
quantify revenue and the logic behind it. We do not know how
many followers would be generated from an activity in advance,
thus, we need to adopt an adaptive strategy, where the decision
who is the next potential initiator depends on the results of past
decisions. Adaptive RMKCG problem can be considered as a
new stochastic optimization problem, and we prove it is NP-
hard, adaptive monotone, but not adaptive submodular. But in
some special cases, it is adaptive submodular and an adaptive
greedy strategy can obtain a (1−1/e)-approximation by adaptive
submodularity theory. Due to the complexity of our model, it is
hard to compute the marginal gain for each candidate user, then,
we propose a convenient and efficient computational method. The
effectiveness and correctness of our algorithms are validated by
heavy simulation on real-world social networks eventually.
Index Terms—Collaborate Game Model, Online Social Net-
works (OSNs), Adaptive Strategy, Stochastic Optimization, Sub-
modularity, Approximation Algorithm
I. INTRODUCTION
THE online social platforms were developing quickly inthe last decades and derived a series of famous techno-
logical companies, such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and
Tencent. There are billions of people sharing their emotions
and discussing current affairs in these platforms. There are
more than 1.52 billion users active daily on Facebook and
321 million users active monthly on Twitter. The users’
friendship in these social platforms can be described by an
online social network (OSNs), which is an undirected graph,
including individuals and their relationship. Domingos and
Richardson [1] [2] was the first one to propose the concept of
”Viral Marketing”, which aims to attract follow-ups as many
as possible by giving free or coupon samples to the most
influential users in OSNs. This groundbreaking researches has
had a profound impact on later generations. Inspired by that,
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Influence Maximization was proposed to model the spread of
trust, advertisements or innovations abstractly. Kempe et al.
[3] regarded it as a combinatorial optimization, which aims to
select a small subset of users such that the expected number
of follow-up adoptions can be maximizied under the size
constraint. Besides, they propsoed two classical diffusion mod-
els called Independent Cascade model and Linear Threshold
model, and prove it is NP-hard, monotone and submodualr
under these two models. Since this seminal work, a series
of variant problems and models used for different scenarios
and constraints [4] [5] [6] [7] appeared constantly, such as
profit maximization, rumor blocking and adaptive submodular
problem. And some researchers focus on the extension [8] [9]
[10] [11] [12] [13] from a practical viewpoint.
However, most existing researches about maximization
problem, regardless of influence or profit, all base on counting
the number of single user that follows our ”influence”. This
model is indeed effective and valid in most cases, but it does
not cover all scenarios. Considering some user in a social
platform, such as Facebook, is invited by some organizations
to launch an activity, after lauching, his/her friends, or friends
of friends, may be interested in this activity and choose to
participate in it. At this time, our influence or profit depends
on the benefits from activity, which is related to the number
of people involved in this event. Based on that, we propose
Collaborate Game Model. Considering a game company, they
plan to promote their multiplayer game in some social platform
by inviting some users to play this game. Once these users
accept this invitation, they initate this game, called initiator,
and he/she will attract friends within a certain range to
participate in it. In our model, we have a k-hop assumption
that the maximum influence range is k-hop from the initiator,
shown as Fig. 1 as an example. Obviously, the revenue should
be calculated on a game-by-game manner instead of user-by-
user. For a single game, the more people involved, the greater
the revenue. But the relation between revenue and the number
of participants is not linear, we construct a valid quantitative
model to compute the revenue from an initiated game.
Remark 1. Even that our model is called as Collaborate game
model, but here, ”game” is abstract concept, which is not just
limited to the game. It can be extended to other multiplayer
activity circumstances.
For example, president election, in order to win a high level
of support, each camp will promote and advocate their own
presidential candidate by inviting some people to support
them. If an invited person expresses his/her support for a
presidential candidate on social media, it is possible to attract
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more people in his/her social circle to support this candidate
together. It can be regarded as an activity, and the revenue can
be gained from that defined as before.
In this paper, we propose the problem of Revenue Maxi-
mization under k-hop Collaborate Game (RMKCG): By invit-
ing limited users to initiate a k-hop Collaborate Game, it aims
to maximize the expected total revenue to the company or
organization. The objective function of RMKCG problem is
based on three parameters: budget b, at most b invitations can
be sent; acceptance vector θ: the probability for each user to
accept the invitation from company; revenue vector R: the
revenue generated by those participant with different level.
Before sending an invitation to a potential initiator, we do
not know whether he/she will accept it and how many users
around him/her will follow and join together. Thus, we adopt
adaptive strategy, where we need to observe the change of
state of both users and networks after sending an invitation,
then decide who will be the next one. The adaptive RMKCG
problem is called A-RMKCG. Golovin et al. [14] formulated
the theory of adaptive optimization, and they proposed two
concepts: adaptive monotonicity and adaptive submodularity,
if satisfying that, a (1 − 1/e)-approximation can be obtained
by adaptive greedy strategy. However, the challenge is that we
prove our A-RMKCG problem is not adaptive submodular, and
the computation of marginal revenue is very inefficient. They
will be solved partially in this paper. Our contributions are
summarized as follows:
1) Collaborate Game Model is a totally new model, which
is a generalization to a class of real problems. Based
on that, we propose RMKCG problem and its adaptive
version A-RMKCG firstly.
2) We prove A-RMKCG problem is NP-hard, adaptive
monotone, but not adaptive submodular.
3) We propose a new method to compute the marginal gain,
which overcomes the difficulty of computation, improve
efficiency and reduce running time greatly. Then, we
prove A-RMKCG problem is adaptive submodular under
some special cases, where we can obtain (1 − 1/e)-
approximation by Adaptive-Invitation policy.
4) Our proposed algorithms are evaluated on real world
social networks, which verify the effectiveness and cor-
rectness of them.
Organization: Sec. II reviews the related survey. Sec.
III descirbes model, background knowledges and problem
formulation. The solution for A-RMKCG are presented in Sec.
IV. Sec. V is the theoretical analysis for A-RMKCG. Sec. VI
discusses experiment and Sec. VII is conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
Domingos and Richardson [1] [2] was the first to study
viral marketing and the value of customers in social networks.
Kempe et al. [3] generalized viral marketing to influence
maximization. It can be considered as a combinatorial op-
timization probelm, and they proposed a greedy algorithm
implemented by Monte-Carlo simulations. Afterward, there
have been many varients of influence maximization, among
which, profit maximization is related to us. [15] [16] proposed
Fig. 1. An example that shows a single activity: Here, the red node is initiator,
and the yellow node is those users that participate the activity launched by
red node.
the problem how to select the most influential seed nodes that
can maximize the profit. Lu et al. [15] combined prices and
valuation by extending the Linear Threshold model, then they
used a heuristic unbudgeted greedy framework to solve this
problem. Tang et al. [16] provided a strong approximation
guarantee with the help of the methods in unconstrained sub-
modular maximization. Other researches on pricing strategies
can refer to [17] [18] [19] [20].
As we know, the approximation ratio of greedy algorithm is
(1−1/e), proved by Nemhauser et al. [21], when the objective
function is monotone and submodular. Golovin et al. [14]
extended this work to adaptive version and obtained the same
approximation ratio when the objective function is adaptive
monotone and adaptive submodular under the full-adoption
feedback model. Under the myopic feedback model, Peng et
al. [22] had proven that adaptive greedy algorithm admits a
constant approximation and Salha et al. [23] proposed the
myopic adaptive greedy policy that is guaranteed to provide
a (1− 1/e)-approximation under a variant of the independent
cascade model. Applied it to social networks, adaptive influ-
ence maximization with partial feedback model was proposed
and studied [24] [25]. Tong et al. [26] provided a systematic
studies on the adaptive influence maximization problem, where
the objective function is not adaptive submodular, and they
introduced the concept of regret ratio in designing the seeding
strategy. Smith et al. [27] introduced the adaptive primal
curvature to obtain an approximation ratio for non-submodular
cases. When the objective function is not adapative monotone,
but adaptive submodular, Gotoves et al. [28] extended random
greedy algorithm to adaptive version and obtained a (1/e)-
approximation. Other researches on the application of adaptive
strategy can refer to [29] [30] [31] [32].
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III. PROBLEM AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we discuss about the formulation of our
problem and preliminary knowledges, mainly including net-
work model and notation, to the rest of paper.
A. Collaborate Game
To understand our game model, we need to know how it
works firstly. To generalize our problem, we imagine a social
relationship network G, from Facebook or WeChat, that a
game company want to promote their new collaborate game
based on this targeted network G. The targeted network G
can be defined arbitrarily by game company, for example, sub-
network of children, sub-network of students or all users in a
network according to the targeted users.
Let us describe how a collaborate game works. First, the
game company needs to acquire the targeted network G
through some social platforms, such as WeChat, the most
popular social software in China. It contains some necessary
users’ information we can exploit, for example, age, gender
and career. More importantly, most social media softwares
have a real-name certification system, which helps us extract
the targeted network according to the properties of game. For
Tencent, it is more convenient, because Tencent is both a social
software company and a game company. Thus for the game
promotion department, such scenes are staged every day. When
the company invites a user u to play this game, if he/she
accepts it, he/she will do as follows:
1) Initiate this game as initiator.
2) Invite his/her friends to participate in this game.
3) If his/her friends are willing to join the game, they will
invite their friends to participate in this game again as
before.
Even though this game is a multiplayer collaborate game,
it does not mean they can invite their friends to participate
without limit. Thus, we have a k-hop assumption, where
the invitations can only last for k rounds. Explaining in
detail, we call initiator as 0-hop participant. The friends of
0-hop participant that accept 0-hop participant’s invitation are
called 1-hop participants. The friends of 1-hop participants
that accept 1-hop participants’ invitation are called 2-hop
participants, repeated until k-hop participants. In other words,
the distance of all participants for this game from initiator
cannot be larger than k-hop in targeted network G, which
limit the scope of a single game.
However, for the game company, it is unrealistic to send too
many invitations to get more initiators because they may not be
able to get complete network information and determine who
will be a potential initiator. Then, for the promotion, giving
too many invitations is sometimes counterproductive, because
this will make their game very cheap and lack competitiveness.
Relied on the above analysis, our problem is who should be
the next initiator that are the most beneficial to maximize the
total revenue.
B. Network Descriptions
A targeted network can be given by a undirected graph G =
(V,E) where V = {v1, v2, ..., vn} is the set of n users. E =
{e1, e2, ..., em} is the set of m undirected edges, where e =
{u, v} ∈ E indicates that there exists friendship between user
u and user v. The node set and edge set for graph G can be
referred as V (G) and E(G) respectively. For an edge e =
{u, v}, u is a friend of v, naturally, v is a friend of u as well.
We use N(v) to denote the set of friends of node v. Here,
we define a probability pe ∈ [0, 1] for each edge e ∈ E(G),
which represents the degree of intimacy between user u and
user v in our model. In other words, when user u participates
in this game, whether user v is willing to participate in this
game with user u if u invites v. Obviously, the more intimate
the two friends are, the more likely they are willing to play
games together.
For the company, they cannot know exactly how much
the degree of intimacy between two users is, thus, the net-
work information is incomplete. From the perspective of data
mining, they can predict the probability between two users
by learning their communication log to judge the degree of
closeness between them. This is beyond the scope of this
paper and we will not discuss here. Once a user u accepts the
invitation from game company as an initiator, the statuses of
those edges whose distance is k-hop from user u are partially
known. According to the previous observation, the company
can make a decision about which potential initiator it the best
next, which is the reason why it is called an adaptive strategy.
Then, there is a natural question whether the user would
accept this invitation as an initiator when he/she receives
it from the game company. We can define an acceptance
probability θu ∈ [0, 1] for each user u ∈ V (G), which
describes the extent to which users are interested in launching
this game when he/she recieves the invitation. From here, an
acceptance vector θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θn) is formulated to give the
acceptance probability for each user. It is complicated because
different users have a divergent tendency to this game. For
example, a game enthusiast may be more inclined to accept
the invitation, or a user with many friends may be happy to
accept ths invitation due to the fact that this game requires
multiple people to participate in. Thus, it is flexible about
how to define acceptance vector. In this paper, we assume θu
is uniformly distributed in interval [0, 1].
C. Problem Definition
The company that promotes a game is naturally hoping
to get revenue from it, and how can we characterize the
revenue from a game. Obviously, the more people involved,
the greater the revenue they can get. However, it is not
enough to measure the income just by the number of people
playing the game. This is a multiplayer game, the actual
number of initiated games is much less than the number of all
participants. Thus, we need to consider comprehensively both
the number of initiated games and the number of participants
in each game. Usually, for each initiatied game, we believe
the marginal revenue is diminishing gradually, in other words,
the increasing rate in earnings is gradually slowing down as
the number of participants increases. Let us see an example:
Example 1. A user u accepts the invitation from the game
company to be an initiator, we assume that this company can
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obtain 5 units revenue from him. User u invites his/her friends,
soon afterward, the company can obtain 4 units revenue from
each that accepts the invitation from user u, namely, 4 units/1-
hop participant. Then, we have 3 units/2-hop participant, 2
units/3-hop participant, and so on until k-hop participant.
This assumption is valid because we believe the promotion
effect brought by the people who first join this game is larger
than the people who join the game afterward. Those who join
this game first need more people to get involved since they
need collaboration, however, people who join this game later
do not have this requirement.
In order to quantify the revenue the company obtains, we
can define a revenue vector R = (R0, R1, R2, ..., Rk), where
Ri ∈ Z+ and i ∈ [k] = {0, 1, 2, ..., k}. Here, Ri denotes
the revenue the company can gain from a i-hop participant,
thus, we have R0 ≥ R1 ≥ R2 ≥ ... ≥ Rk according to our
previous assumption. In the targeted network, the number of
initiators (0-hop participants) is clear, but other participants
are likely to be ambiguous. For example, a user u is a i-hop
participant to one initiator and j-hop participant to another
initiator, where i < j. At this moment, we consider user u
will choose to be a i-hop participant to the company. We call
it as ”Tendency Assumption”. Based on the above model, for a
game company, they aim to give a certain number of invitations
to initial users such that maximizing the expected revenue. The
problem of Revenue Maximization under k-hop Collaborate
Game (RMKCG) is defined as follows:
Problem 1 (RMKCG). Given a targeted network G = (V,E),
an acceptance vector θ, a budget b and a revenue vector R,
we aim to find a subset D ⊆ V (G) and |D| ≤ b such that the
expected total revenue the company gains can be maximized
when inviting those users in D to be initiators.
For adaptive strategy, the RMKCG problem can be trans-
formed to find a policy pi, where the company will send an
invitation to user u ∈ D step by step. When the user u accepts
to be an initiator, the partial statuses of edges that are within
k-hop from u are known, thus, the network information can
be updated. A valid policy pi can at most send b invitations.
The adaptive strategy can be considered as a stochastic
process, whose stochasticity is mainly from the following two
aspects: For user u, the probability (θu) that he/she accepts
the invitation from the company as an initiator; For user
v, the probability (puv) that he/she joins the game when
his/her friend u invites him/her to play together. Now, we can
define the state of targeted network. Given a targeted network
G = (V,E), for each user u ∈ V (G), the state of u can
be denoted by Xu ∈ {0, 1} ∪ {?}, where Xu = 1 means
user u accepts to be an initiator because of the company’s
invitation and Xu = 0 means user u rejects to be an initiator.
Xu =? means user u is unknown, who did not receive an
invitation from the company. The states of all users are ? at the
beginning. Similarly, for each edge e = {u, v} ∈ E(G), the
state of e can be denoted by Ye = {0, 1}∪{?}, where Ye = 0
indicates user u (resp. v) did not accept the invitation from
user v (resp. u) and Ye = 1 indicates user u (resp. v) is willing
to play the game with user v (resp. u). Once determined, it
Fig. 2. An example that shows the adaptive process: Here, we assume k = 2,
where the state of yellow nodes are 1, other nodes are ?; Green and purple
nodes are 1-hop and 2-hop participants; The state of red, blue and dotted line
are 1, 0 and ?. First, we invite node c, the states shown as left part; Then,
we invite node h, the states shown as right part. We can see that node e is
changed from 2-hop to 1-hop participant because of node h.
cannot be changed. Ye =? indicates there is no invitation that
happens between user u and user v. The states of all edges
are ? at the beginning.
After defining the states of users and edges, we have a
function mapping likes
φ = {Xu}u∈V (G) ∪ {Ye}e∈E(G) → {0, 1}V (G) ∪ {0, 1}E(G)
called a realization (the states of all items in V (G) and E(G)).
Thus, we say that φ(u) is the state of user u ∈ V (G) and φ(e)
is the state of edge e ∈ E(G) under realization φ. We use Φ
to denote a random realization and Pr(φ) = Pr[Φ = φ] as
the probability distribution over all realizations. Besides, each
realization should be consistent. Here, each user can only be
one of state in Xu ∈ {0, 1} ∪ {?}, and each edge be one
of state in {0, 1} ∪ {?} identically. Considering the adaptive
version of RMKCG problem (A-RMKCG Problem), the game
company does as follows:
1) Initialize D = ∅
2) Send an invitation to user u ∈ V (G)\D, observe Φ(u)
3) Update D = D ∪ {u}
4) If Φ(u) = 0, go to step (6)
5) Update the states of edges whose distance are less
than k-hop from user u, and record these update as a
reference for next decision
6) If |D| < k, go back to step (1); Otherwise, stop
From step (5), we know that this process satisfies the definition
of full-adoption feedback model, where the company is able
to see the entire diffusion process of each initiator they select
and then, decide who will be the next one.
Let us see Fig. 2 as a concrete example. We define H(pi, φ)
as the set of all users who are invited by the game company
according to strategy pi under the realization φ. After each
invitation, shown as above process, the states of partial edges
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can be updated, our observation so far can be represented as a
partial realization ψ, which is a function of observed objects to
their states. Then, dom(ψ) is referred to as the domain of ψ,
namely, observed users and edges in ψ. A partial realization ψ
is consistent with a realization φ if they are equal everywhere
in the domain of ψ, denoted by φ ∼ ψ. If ψ and ψ′ are both
consistent with some φ, and dom(ψ) ⊆ dom(ψ′), we say ψ
is a subrealization of ψ′, denoted by ψ ⊆ ψ′. [14] Besides,
we denote by dx(ψ) the observed users in the domain of ψ,
and dy(ψ) the observed edges in the domain of ψ.
Let pi be an adaptive invitation policy of the company. The
total revenue gained according to policy pi under the realization
φ can be defined as follows:
f(H(pi, φ), φ) =
∑
i∈[k]
∑
u∈Di(pi,φ)
Ri (1)
where [k] = {0, 1, 2, ..., k} and Di(pi, φ) is the set that
contains all i-hop participants to the company according to
strategy pi under realization φ, thus, we have
D0(pi, φ) = {u|u ∈ H(pi, φ), φ(u) = 1} (2)
Di(pi, φ) =
{u|∃v ∈ Di−1(pi, φ), φ({u, v}) = 1} \
i−1⋃
j=0
Dj(pi, φ) (3)
Finally, we can evaluate the performance of a policy pi by its
expected revenue, and we have
favg(pi) = EΦ[f(H(pi,Φ),Φ)] (4)
where the expectation is taken with respect to Pr(Φ = φ).
The goal of A-RMKCG problem is to find a policy pi∗ such
that pi∗ ∈ arg maxpi favg(pi) subject to |H(pi, φ)| ≤ b for all
realization φ.
IV. ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose our algorithm to solve A-
RMKCG problem, Adaptive-Invitation Algorithm, and intro-
duce how to compute marginal gain efficiently.
A. Adaptive-Invitation Algorithm
According to the description of A-RMKCG problem, in-
spired by adaptive greedy policy proposed by [14], Adaptive-
Invitation Algorithm is proposed, which can be divided into
two steps generally: In the first step, we send an invitation to
user u that can obtain the most increment of expected revenue
according to partial realization ψ. This step can be generalized
to Conditional Expected Marginal Revenue, which is slightly
different from [14],
Definition 1 (Conditional Expected Marginal Revenue). Given
a partial realization ψ and an user u, the conditional expected
marginal revenue of u conditioned on have observed ψ is
∆(u|ψ) = E [f(dx(ψ) ∪ {u},Φ)− f(dx(ψ),Φ)|Φ ∼ ψ]
In our A-RMKCG problem, ∆(u|ψ) is the expected total rev-
enue based on previous invited users and observed edges, and
the expectation is taken over all realization that are consistent
Algorithm 1 Adaptive-Invitation (G, f,θ,R, b, k)
1: Initialize: H ← ∅, ψ ← ∅
2: for i = 1 to b do
3: for user u ∈ V (G)\H do
4: ∆(u|ψ)← Computed by Monte-Carlo simulations or
simplified method in Algorithm 2
5: end for
6: Select ui ∈ arg maxu ∆(u|ψ)
7: H ← H ∪ {ui}
8: if u∗ accepts the invitation then
9: Update ψ, the states of the edges whose distance are
less than k-hop from u
10: end if
11: end for
12: return f(H,ψ)
with current partial realization ψ. After inviting user u as an
initiator, in the second step, we need to observe the state of
u. If u accepts this invitation, it updates current observation,
namely, updates the states of edges whose distance within k-
hop from u; If u rejects this invitation, back to the first step to
invite next user. The Adaptive-Invitation Algorithm is shown
in Algorithm 1. They will be executed iteratively until the
number of invitation by company is larger than b.
Example 2. We consider a graph with five users and four
edges {v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, {v3, v4} and {v4, v5}. Suppose that
pe = 0.5 for each edge e and θv = 1 for each node v, budget
b = 2 and hop k = 2. According to Algorithm 1, the company
will first invite v3 undoubtedly. Suppose that v2 accepts, but
v4 rejects their friend v1’s invitations, then v1 rejects his/her
friend v2’s invitations. Now, the states (partial realization ψ1)
can be shown as follows:
What will happen next? We should compute their marginal
gains according to ψ1. We have ∆(v1|ψ1) = R0, ∆(v2|ψ1) =
R0−R1, ∆(v4|ψ1) = R0+R1/2 and ∆(v5|ψ1) = R0+R1/2.
Thus, the company will invite v4 or v5 as the second initiator.
Suppose that the company invite v4, and v5 accepted his/her
friend v4’s invitation. Now, the states (partial realization ψ2)
can be shown as follows:
Here, we have H(pia, ψ2) = {v3, v4} and f(H(pia, ψ2), ψ2) =
2(R0 +R1) eventually.
Actually, in line 3 to 4 of Algorithm 1, we do not need to
compute ∆(u|ψ) for each user u ∈ V (G)\H again at each
iteration, becuase the value of ∆(u|ψ) depends only on the
states of edges within k-hop from u. If they do not change,
the value of ∆(u|ψ) is consistent with last iteration natrually.
In iteration i, provided that the distance between user ui−1
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and u is larger than 2k, the states of edges within k-hop from
u maintain consistency with iteration i − 1, thus, we do not
need to compute ∆(u|ψ) again. Therefore, it is necessary to
maintain a record for the value of each ∆(·|ψ). In iteration i,
we check whether the distance between u and ui−1 is less or
equal to 2k, if yes, update the value of ∆(u|ψ). It improves
the efficiency of Algorithm 1 partially.
Remark 2. Unfortunately, we know that the social networks
usually show a property of small world, which implies that
when k = 3, most of the users are within 6-hop from users
ui−1. Hence, only a small fraction of nodes do not require an
update when k ≥ 3. Of course, if we can know the structure
information of the targeted network in advance, it will help
us decide whether we need to use the above method, because
finding the distance from user ui−1 is time-consuming.
B. Gain Computation
In line 4 of Algorithm 1, we need to compute the value of
∆(u|ψ) given current realization ψ, which is deterministic.
Due to the fact that the ∆(u|ψ) is an expectation with
respect to Φ ∼ ψ, the general method is to use Monte-Carlo
simulations, where we run this diffusion process many times
and then take the average of them. But it is extremely time-
comsuming in order to get an accurate value. Thus, in this
subsection, we talk about how to compute ∆(u|ψ) efficiently,
the main idea is shown in Algorithm 2.
For each user u, we assume there is a map containing a user
{u : a}, where a ∈ [0, 1] is a probability. First, we initialize a
list L, whose elements are maps, whose elements are users and
their probabilities. For example, we set k = 2, and we have
L = [{u1 : a1}, {u2 : a2, u3 : a3}, {u4 : a4, u5 : a5}]. We say
L[0] = {u1 : a1} is initiator and its acceptance probability,
L[1] = {u2 : a2, u3 : a3} are 1-hop participants and their
probabilities that they participate in the game initiated by user
u1 and L[2] are 2-hop participants and their probabilities to
that. In line 5 to line 16 of Algorithm 2, we find all possible
participants within k-hop from the initiator and put them in the
correct position in list L, namely, 0-hop participant in L[0],
1-hop participants in L[1] and so on. The initial probabilities
are set to 0. Then, we define function h(u|ψ), that is
h(u|ψ) =
{
i u is i-hop participant under ψ
∞ u is not participant
Here, we define R[∞] = 0. In line 17 to 18 of Algorithm 2,
we set the acceptance probability to user u as an initiator, and
then, update ∆(u|ψ). Beginning from line 19, for all possible
i-hop participants, we set their participation probability from
line 20 to 32. To understand the idea of this part, let us see
following example:
Example 3. We assume user {u : a} ∈ L[2], a = 0, is
a possible 2-hop participant to initiator u, and there are
three users {x1 : a1}, {x2 : a2}, {x3 : a3} ∈ L[1]
that existing edges {x1, u}, {x2, u}, {x3, u} ∈ E(G). If
{x1, u} ∈ dom(ψ), ψ({x1, u}) = 1; {x2, u} ∈ dom(ψ),
ψ({x2, u}) = 0 and {x3, u} /∈ dom(ψ), we can update a
as a = 1− (1− a1)(1− 0)(1− pux3 · a3).
Algorithm 2 Compute (G, f,θ,R, k, ψ, u)
1: Initialize: list L = [], set S = ∅
2: L = L+ {u : 0}
3: S = S ∪ {u}
4: ∆(u|ψ) = 0
5: for i = 1 to k do
6: Initialize: map Vi = {}
7: for v in L[i− 1] do
8: for v′ in N(v) do
9: if v′ /∈ S then
10: Vi[v
′] = 0
11: S = S ∪ {v′}
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: L = L+ Vi
16: end for
17: L[0][u] = θu
18: ∆(u|ψ)+ = θu · (R[0]−R[h(u|ψ)])
19: for i = 1 to k do
20: for v in L[i] do
21: Initialize: t = 1
22: for v′ in N(v) do
23: if v′ in L[i− 1] then
24: if {v′, v} ∈ dom(ψ) and ψ({v′, v}) == 1 then
25: t = t ∗ (1− L[i− 1][v′])
26: else if {v′, v} /∈ dom(ψ) then
27: t = t ∗ (1− pvv′ · L[i− 1][v′])
28: end if
29: end if
30: end for
31: L[i][v] = 1− t
32: end for
33: for v in L[i] do
34: if i < h(v|ψ) then
35: ∆(u|ψ)+ = L[i][v] · (R[i]−R[h(v|ψ)])
36: end if
37: end for
38: end for
39: return ∆(u|ψ)
Then, from line 33 to 37, it aims to compute the revenue gain
for all possible i-hop participants. For user v, {v : a} ∈ L[i],
if i < h(v|ψ), we can obtain the gain a · (R[i]−R[h(v|ψ)])
according to the assumption in Section 3.3, if i ≥ h(v|ψ), no
gain. The algorithm is completed.
It is worth noting that this computational method is
not absolutely accurate because of the complexity of A-
RMKCG problem. Consider the targeted network G = {e1 =
{v1, v2}, e2 = {v2, v3}, e3 = {v1, v3}}, θv1 = 1, k = 2, the
expected revenue from user v2 when the company sends an
inviation to v1, that is,
= (Pr[Φ({e1}) = 1])R[1]
+ (Pr[Φ({e1}) = 0] Pr[Φ({e2}) = 1] Pr[Φ({e3}) = 1])R[2]
We neglect the second term in Algorithm 2. In the most cases,
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the value of the second term is much less than that of the
first term. If necessary to calculate ∆(u|ψ) accurately, we are
still required to use Monte-Carlo simulations. Obviously, the
more times the simulation is performed, the more accurate the
target value and the longer the running time is. Algorithm 2
improves operational efficiency greatly under the premise of
ensuring accuracy.
C. Time Complexity
Considering the line 4 of Algorithm 1, to compute ∆(u|ψ)
based on Monte-Carlo simulations, the running time is
bounded by O(mr). Thus, the total running time is O(bnmr)
where r is the number of Monte-Carlo simulations. With the
help of the simplified gain computation, shown in Algorithm
2, let us first analyze the running time to compute ∆(u|ψ) by
Algorithm 2. Here, the running time is bound by O(n +m).
Thus, the total running time is O(bn(n+m)). As we know, to
estimate ∆(u|ψ) accurately, the value of r is very large. The
time complexity of Adaptive-Invitation algorithm is improved
tremendously if computing ∆(u|ψ) by Algorithm 2 instead of
Monte-Carlo simulations.
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we talk about the hardness and adaptive sub-
modularity of A-RMKCG problem, and get an approximation
ratio of Algorithm 1.
A. Hardness
In order to show the hardness of A-RMKCG problem, we
can start from a classical NP-hard problem, Maximum Cover-
age (MC) problem, and reduce MC to A-RMKCG problem in
polynomial time. The decision version of MC can be defined
as follows:
Definition 2 (MC). Given an integer b, a collection of sets
S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} and an integer Q, we ask whether it
exists a subcollection S′ ⊆ S such that |S′| ≤ b and the
number of covered elements |⋃Si∈S′ Si| ≥ Q.
Theorem 1. A-RMKCG problem is NP-hard, because its
special case can be reduced to MC in polynomial time.
Proof. The decision version of A-RMKCG problem: Given an
interger b, a targeted network G = (V,E) and an integer Q′,
we ask whether it exists a policy pi and |H(pi, φ)| ≤ b for all
φ such that favg(pi) ≥ Q′. To get a special case, we make
some assumptions about the original problem: We set k = 1,
initiator only send invitation to his/her directed friends; the
revenue from each participant is 1, revenue vector R = (1, 1);
the acceptance probability for each user is 1, acceptance vector
θ = (1, 1, 1, ..., 1); and the probability pe for each edge is 1,
the realization is unique.
Let us construct the equivalent relation between MC and A-
RMKCG. Given an instance of MC, we can define an instance
of A-RMKCG as: W =
⋃
Si∈S Si, for each node wj ∈ W ,
we create a node vj in the instance of A-RMKCG. For each
set Si ∈ S, we create a node v′i in the instance of A-RMKCG.
Thus, we have V (G) = {v1, v2, ..., v|W |} ∪ {v′1, v′2, ..., v′|S|}.
Fig. 3. A sketch that shows an example: reduction between MC and A-
RMKCG problem.
For each node vj ∈ Si, we create an undirected edge
between vj and v′i, thus, E(G) =
⋃|S|
i=1
(⋃|Si|
j=1{v′i, vj}
)
. The
construction can be done in polynomial time and shown in
Fig. 3. Based on the above assumptions, all users in contructed
graph G would accepted the invitations if they receive it. Let
Q′ = Q+ b, we have:
MC⇒A-RMKCG: Given an instance of MC, S′ ⊆ S, |S′| ≤
b and |⋃Si∈S′ Si| ≥ Q, as an instance of A-RMKCG, we
make the policy pi invite the users in D = {v′i|Si ∈ S′} in
any order. We can know that |H(pi, φ)| ≤ b for all φ, φ is
unique, and favg(pi) ≥ Q+ b = Q′.
A-RMKCG⇒MC: Given an instance of A-RMKCG, a
policy pi such that |H(pi, φ)| ≤ b and favg(pi) ≥ Q + b, we
have following observation. First, in the constructed network
G, if pi selects a node vj , vj ∈ {v1, v2, ..., v|W |}, and it does
not select a v′i, v
′
i ∈ {v′1, v′2, ..., v′|S|}, that connects to vj ,
then we assume there is another policy κ that selects one
of v′i that connects to vj instead of vj . Obviously, we have
favg(κ) ≥ favg(pi) because the number of neighbors of v′i
is greater or at least equal to that of vj , thus, we can make
more users participate in this game when inviting v′i instead
of vj . As an instance of MC, we select the subcollection
S′ = {Si|v′i ∈ H(κ, φ)}. We can know that |S′| ≤ b and
|⋃Si∈S′ Si| ≥ favg(κ)− b ≥ favg(pi)− b ≥ Q.
Therefore, the simplest special case of A-RMKCG can be
reduced to MC problem, which means that it has at least the
same hardness as MC, A-RMKCG problem is NP-hard. The
proof is completed.
B. Approximation Performance
In [14], Golovin et al. proposed two important concepts:
Adaptive Monitonicity and Adaptive Submodularity, and prove
we can obtain a (1 − 1/e)-approximate solution by adaptive
greedy strategy if the adaptive optimization problem satisfies
these two properties. Our A-RMKCG problem is an instance of
adaptive optimization problem, thus, supposing our objective
function, Equation (4), is adaptive monotone and adaptive
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submodular, we can obtain a similar result. Based on [14],
these two concepts are as follows:
Definition 3 (Adaptive Monotonicity). A function f is adap-
tive monotone with respect to distribution Pr(φ) if the condi-
tional expected marginal revenue of any user u is nonnegative,
i.e., for all ψ with Pr[Φ ∼ ψ] > 0 and all u ∈ V (G)\dx(ψ),
we have
∆(u|ψ) ≥ 0 (5)
Definition 4 (Adaptive Submodularity). A function f is adap-
tive submodular with respect to distribution Pr(φ) if the
conditional expected marginal revenue of any user u does not
increase as more states of users and edges are observed, i.e.,
for all ψ and ψ′ such that ψ is a subrealization of ψ′ (ψ ⊆ ψ′)
and all u ∈ V (G)\dx(ψ′), we have
∆(u|ψ) ≥ ∆(u|ψ′) (6)
Then, we can obtain our theoretical results, which is de-
scribed as follows:
Lemma 1. The objective function f of the A-RMKCG problem
is adaptive monotone.
Proof. Considering a fixed observation ψ, for a user u ∈
V (G)\dx(ψ), if sending an invitation to u, there are two
situations that can happen: accept or reject. If user u accept
to be an initiator, the value of marginal gain is at least equal
to R[0]−R[h(u|ψ)]; otherwise, there is no marginal gain. the
marginal gain is nonnegative in both cases. Thus, under any
realization φ, we have f(dx(ψ)∪{u}, φ) ≥ f(dx(ψ), φ). The
expected marginal gain ∆(u|ψ) is the linear combination of
each realization, so ∆(u|ψ) ≥ 0 as well.
Lemma 2. The objective function f of the A-RMKCG problem
is not adaptive submodular.
Proof. Considering an example that targeted graph is G =
{{v0, v1}, {v1, v2}, {v1, v3}}, k = 2, pv0v1 = 0.1, pv1v2 =
0.1, pv1v3 = 0.1, we have two partial realization ψ1 = ∅
and ψ2 = {v0, {v0, v1}, {v1, v2}, {v1, v3}}. ψ1 means they do
not receive any invitation from company, and ψ2 means v0
accepts to be an initiator and observes that {v0, v1}, {v1, v2}
and {v1, v3} exist. Clearly, ψ1 ⊆ ψ2. Relied on Definition 1,
∆(v1|ψ1) = 0.5 ·(R0 +3×0.1×R1) because of E[θv1 ] = 0.5.
However, ∆(v1|ψ2) = 0.5 · [(R0 − R1) + 2 × (R1 − R2)].
Here, assume R = (5, 3, 1), we have ∆(v1|ψ1) = 2.95 and
∆(v1|ψ2) = 3. Thus, ∆(v3|ψ1) < ∆(v3|ψ2), f is not adaptive
submodular.
Even though that, in some special cases, it is adaptive sub-
modular unexpectedly. Let us see
Remark 3. Given two partial realization that ψ ⊆ ψ′, we
have h(v|ψ) ≥ h(v|ψ′) for each user v due to the fact that
tendency assumption shown as before.
Lemma 3. If our A-RMKCG problem conforms one of fol-
lowing two special cases:
1) k ≤ 1
2) For all {u, v} ∈ E(G), puv = 1
The objective function f is adaptive submodular.
Proof. In order to prove adaptive submodularity, we need to
show, for any partial realization ψ, ψ′ such that ψ ⊆ ψ′, we
have ∆(u|ψ) ≥ ∆(u|ψ′). Similar to the proof of adaptive
monotonicity, we consider two fix observation ψ, ψ′ such that
ψ ⊆ ψ′ and a user u ∈ V (G)\dx(ψ′). Given an observation
ψ, we define the marginal gain under realization φ ∼ ψ as
∆[(u|ψ)|φ]:
∆(u|ψ, φ ∼ ψ) = f(dx(ψ) ∪ {u}, φ)− f(dx(ψ), φ) (7)
Assuming that there are two realizations such that φ ∼ ψ
and φ′ ∼ ψ′, we have φ(v) = φ′(v) for all v /∈ dx(ψ′) and
φ({u, v}) = φ′({u, v}) for all {u, v} /∈ dy(ψ′), thus they have
the same part α = ψ ∪ (φ′\ψ′). Now we can prove
∆(u|ψ, φ ∼ ψ) ≥ ∆(u|ψ′, φ′ ∼ ψ′) (8)
for all u ∈ dx(ψ′). We will discuss the above two cases
seperately as follows:
1) For the first case, when k = 0, Equation (8) is estab-
lished obvious because of Remark 1. When k = 1, if
u accepts the invitation, we have R[0] −R[h(u|ψ)] ≥
R[0] − R[h(u|ψ′)], the gain of u under ψ is eqaul or
larger than that under ψ′. For each user v ∈ N(u), if
{u, v} ∈ dom(α), the gain of v under ψ is eqaul or
larger than that under ψ′ regardless α({u, v}) = 1 or 0.
If {u, v} ∈ dom(ψ′\ψ), when ψ′({u, v}) = 0, there is
no gain of v under ψ′; when ψ′({u, v}) = 1, ψ′(v) = 0
definitely, there is no gain of v under ψ′. Thus, whatever
φ({u, v}) is, the gain of v under ψ is eqaul or larger than
that under ψ′. If u rejects the invitation, there is no gain
both ψ and ψ′. Integrating all situations, Equation (8) is
established.
2) For the second case, for all {u, v} ∈ E(G), puv = 1, the
state of edges under realization φ and φ′ are identical.
ψ ⊆ ψ′ means that dx(ψ) ⊆ dx(ψ′), based on Remark
1, it is esay to get Equation (8).
According to Eqaution (7), Equation (8) and Definition 1,
we have as follows: ∆(u|φ) =
=
∑
φ∼ψ
Pr[φ|φ ∼ ψ]∆(u|ψ, φ ∼ ψ)
=
∑
φ′∼ψ′
Pr[φ′|φ′ ∼ ψ′]
∑
φ∼α
Pr[φ|φ ∼ α]∆(u|ψ, φ ∼ ψ)
Since Equation (8) and
∑
φ∼α Pr[φ|φ ∼ α] = 1,
≥
∑
φ′∼ψ′
Pr[φ′|φ′ ∼ ψ′]
∑
φ∼α
Pr[φ|φ ∼ α]∆(u|ψ′, φ′ ∼ ψ′)
≥
∑
φ′∼ψ′
Pr[φ′|φ′ ∼ ψ′]∆(u|ψ′, φ′ ∼ ψ′)
∑
φ∼α
Pr[φ|φ ∼ α]
=
∑
φ′∼ψ′
Pr[φ′|φ′ ∼ ψ′]∆(u|ψ′, φ′ ∼ ψ′)
= ∆(u|φ′)
Therefore, ∆(u|ψ) ≥ ∆(u|ψ′), the proof of adaptive submod-
ularity is completed.
Remark 4. Even though the A-RMKCG problem is not adap-
tive submodular, we can know that the objective function f
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is getting close to be adaptive submodular, when k becomes
smaller or the probabilities of edges are approaching to 1.
Shown as the proof of Lemma 2, it is a typical non-submodular
case, the likelihood such case happens is reduced gradually
when k becomes smaller or puv → 1 for each {u, v} ∈ E(G).
Theorem 2. The adaptive policy pia, given by Adaptive-
Invitation algorithm, for our A-RMKCG problem is a (1−1/e)-
approximate solution when k ≤ 1 or puv = 1 for each
{u, v} ∈ E(G). Hence, we have
favg(pia) ≥ (1− 1/e) · favg(pi∗) (9)
Proof. Based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, the objective
function f is adaptive monotone and submodular, adaptive
greedy policy is a (1 − 1/e)-approximation according to the
conclusion of [14].
VI. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we need to validate the effectiveness and
correctness of our proposed adaptive polices on several real
social networks. The datasets in our experiments are from
networkrepository.com [33], which is an website of network
repository. Three datasets with different size are used in our
experiments. The dataset-1 is a co-authorship network, where
each edge is a co-authorship among scientists in network the-
ory and experiments. The dataset-2 is a Wiki network, which
is a who-votes-on-whom network collected from Wikipedia.
The dataset-3 is a social friendship network extracted from
Facebook consisting of people with edges representing friend-
ship ties. The statistics information of the three datasets is
represented in table I.
TABLE I
THE STATISTICS OF THE GRAPHS USED IN OUR EXPERIMENTS [33]
Dataset n m Type Avg. Degree
Dataset-1 0.4K 1.01K undirected 4.00
Dataset-2 1.0K 3.15K undirected 6.00
Dataset-3 3.0K 65.2K undirected 48.0
A. Experimental Settings
As mentioned earlier, our proposed algorithms associated
with A-RMKCG are based on the following parameters: Hop
number k (at most k-hop participants follow an initiator),
Acceptance vector θ, Revenue vector R, budget b and edge
probability. For each e ∈ E(G), we set pe = 0.5 and for each
user u, θu is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. There are two
experiments we perform in this part: Algorithm 2 performance
and Algorithm 1 performance. For the performance of Algo-
rithm 2, we have shown that the value of ∆(u|ψ) computed
by Algorithm 2 is not precise completely when k ≥ 2, and
accurate value can be obtained by Monte-Carlo simulation.
In this experiment, we aim to evaluate the effectiveness and
efficiency of our Algorithm 2, compared with Monte-Carlo
simulation. We run the Monte-Carlo simulation 100 times and
take the average of them to compute the value of ∆(u|ψ).
Fig. 4. The performance of Adaptive-Invitation changes over budget b under
the dataset-1. To compute ∆(u|ψ), one is by Algorithm 2, another one is by
Monte-Carlo simulations. The left figure is under k = 2 and right figure is
under k = 3.
For the performance of Algorithm 1, in this experiment, we
test our Algorithm 1 with some common heuristic algorithms
and compare the results of performance. It aims to evaluate
the effectiveness of our adaptive invitation strategy. This
experiment can be divided into three parts: k = 1, k = 2 and
k = 3, and their revenue vector is set as (8, 6), (8, 6, 4) and
(8, 6, 4, 2), which means that the revenue of 0-hop participant
is 8 units, 1-hop is 6 units, 2-hop is 4 units and 3-hop is
2 units. Our proposed algorithms are compared with some
baseline algorithms:
1) MaxDegree: Invite the user with maximum degree at
each step within budget b.
2) Random: Invite a user randomly from V (G) at each step
within budget b.
3) MaxProb: Invite the user with maximum acceptance
probability at each step within budget b.
4) MaxDegreeProb: Invite the user with maximum product
of degree multiplying acceptance probability at each step
within budget b.
We use python to test each algorithms. The simulation is run
on a Windows machine with a 3.40GHz, 4 core Intel CPU and
16GB RAM.
TABLE II
THE RUNNING TIME COMPARISON
k=2 k=3
Alg. 2 M-C Alg. 2 M-C
b=10 0.339s 544.731s 1.663s 858.971s
b=20 0.578s 836.811s 3.077s 1432.74s
b=30 0.755s 1052.06s 4.244s 1947.38s
b=40 0.892s 1242.95s 5.318s 2410.27s
b=50 1.011s 1417.15s 6.309s 2862.12s
b=60 1.163s 1603.03s 7.253s 3251.53s
B. Experimental Results
In our experiments, the whole graphs are considered as the
targeted networks. We run these adaptive algorithms on three
datasets, and for each algorithm, we simulate 50 times and
take the average of them, besides, we record the standard
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(a) k = 1
(b) k = 2
(b) k = 3
Fig. 5. The performance comparison changes between Adaptive-Invitation
and other heuristic algorithms over budget b under dataset-2. Left column is
the stardard deviation of Adaptive-Invitation; Right column is the performance
comparison.
deviation for Adaptive-Invitation algorithm. The analysis of
these experimental results is summarized as follows.
Fig. 4 draws the performance achieved by Adaptive-
Invitation algorithm under the dataset-1, which aims to com-
pare the performance and running time of Algorithm 1, com-
puting ∆(u|ψ) by Algorithm 2 or by Monte-Carlo simulations.
In other words, in line 4 of Algorithm 1, one uses Algorithm
2, another one uses Monte-Carlo simulations. Shown as Fig.
4, the total revenue achieved by use of Algorithm 2 and
Monte-Carlo simulations is very close. It is more apparent
when k = 3, and the result returned by these two methods
is almost the same. Even though the performance of Monte-
Carlo simulations is slightly better than that of Algorithm 2,
this difference is acceptable and it is related to topological
structure of targeted networks. However, the running time for
Algorithm 2 is much less than Monte-Carlo simulations, and
obviously, the larger the graph is, the more significant this gap
will be. The running time comparison between Algorithm 2
and Monte-Carlo simulations is represented in table II. The
running speed is increased by at least a thousand times by
Algorithm 2. From this meaningful results, we can see that
(a) k = 1
(b) k = 2
(b) k = 3
Fig. 6. The performance comparison changes between Adaptive-Invitation
and other heuristic algorithms over budget b under dataset-3. Left column is
the stardard deviation of Adaptive-Invitation; Right column is the performance
comparison.
Algorithm 2 makes A-RMKCG problem be scalable to large
real social networks.
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 draw the performance comparison achieved
by Adaptive-Invitation and other heuristic algorithms, and
standard deviation of Adaptive-Invitation algorithm under the
dataset-2 and dataset-3. From the left column of Fig. 5 and
Fig. 6, we can observe two features: (1) The standard deviation
drops with the increase of hop k under the same dataset;
(2) The standard deviation drops with the increase of budget
b under the same dataset and hop. We attempt to give a
valid explanation here. The uncertainty mainly comes from
the nodes’ acceptance probability and the edges’ probability.
When k is smaller, for example, k = 1, if a user u does not
accept the invitation, the revenue from all his/her neighbors
is 0 certainly unless there are other initiators existing among
them. Conversely, when k is larger, for example, k = 3,
his/her neighbors are possible to be 1-hop or 2-hop participants
even if there is no initiator, which lead to the gap of revenue
reduced. Thus, larger k leads to smaller standard deviation.
Then, with budget b increasing, marginal gain is decremented
generally, and the gap brought by the difference of the number
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of initiators is reduced. Thus, larger b leads to smaller standard
deviation as well.
From the right column of Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, the expected to-
tal revenue returned by Adaptive-Invitation is better than other
policies under any datasets and hop number, so its performance
is the best. Among these heuristic policies, MaxDegreeProb
has the best performance, because it considers the degree
and acceptance probability comprehensizely. It proves our
theoretical analysis in the last section. We have said that the
objective function is not adaptive submodular when k ≥ 2, but
in this figure, it shows the characteristics of submodularity as
well, which means that the degree of submodularity is related
to the structure of networks and probability setting.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we build a new model, Collaborate Game, to
model some real scenarios that cannot be covered by existing
model. Then, we propose an adaptive RMKCG problem, and
prove it is NP-hard, adaptive monotone but not adaptive
submodular. Even that, we show that under some special case,
k ≤ 1 and pe = 1 for all e ∈ E(G), the objective function is
adaptive submodular, which can be solved within (1 − 1/e)-
approximation. Besides, we propose an effective method to
overcome the difficulty in computing marginal gain, which
makes it be scalable. The good performance of our algorithms
is verified by our experiments on three real network datasets.
The future work can be divided into two parts: (1) Trying
to find a more generalized model, and combine with the
technique of data mining to optimize the parameter setting.
(2) Trying to solve the general case, in other words, get the
theoretical bound for adaptive non-submodular cases.
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